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A Negotiation Style Recommender Based on 
Computational Ecology in Open Negotiation 
Environments 
 
Josep Lluis de la Rosa, Nicolás Hormazábal, Silvana Aciar, Gabriel Lopardo, Albert Trias, and Miquel Montaner
   Abstract1 — The system described herein represents the first 
example of a recommender system in digital ecosystems where 
agents negotiate services on behalf of small companies. The small 
companies compete not only with price or quality, but with a 
wider service-by-service composition by subcontracting with 
other companies. The final result of these offerings depends on 
negotiations at the scale of millions of small companies. This 
scale requires new platforms for supporting digital business 
ecosystems, as well as related services like open-id, trust 
management, monitors and recommenders.  This is done in the 
Open Negotiation Environment (ONE), which is an open-source 
platform that allows agents, on behalf of small companies, to 
negotiate and use the ecosystem services, and enables the 
development of new agent technologies.  The methods and tools 
of cyber engineering are necessary to build up Open Negotiation 
Environments that are stable, a basic condition for predictable 
business and reliable business environments. Aiming to build 
stable digital business ecosystems by means of improved 
collective intelligence, we introduce a model of negotiation style 
dynamics from the point of view of computational ecology. This 
model inspires an ecosystem monitor as well as a novel 
negotiation style recommender. The ecosystem monitor provides 
hints to the negotiation style recommender to achieve greater 
stability of an open negotiation environment in a digital business 
ecosystem. The greater stability provides the small companies 
with higher predictability, and therefore better business results. 
The negotiation style recommender is implemented with a 
simulated annealing algorithm at a constant temperature, and its 
impact is shown by applying it to a real case of an open 
negotiation environment populated by Italian companies.  
  Index Terms — Recommender Systems, Agents,  
I. INTRODUCTION 
PEN Negotiation Environments are platforms where 
agents, on behalf of small companies, negotiate 
contracts, terms and conditions for services.  These 
platforms must provide tools for trust and open-id, since new 
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agents can continuously come in and out of the negotiation 
environments. Furthermore, these platforms must be reliable 
when working with potentially millions of agents. Cyber-
engineering methods inspired by computational ecologies will 
provide new services that agents may use in a collective way 
to produce more intelligent and robust behavior. Negotiation 
environments, as well as distributed manufacturing facilities 
and the distributed provision of services, require a strong web-
based IT infrastructure that is cost effective and flexible. [1] 
This environment should be developed in open source [20] to 
reduce bugs, increase security and boost cyber-engineering 
innovation. 
The goal is to introduce high-level knowledge about a 
business ecosystem so that slightly modified agent negotiation 
behavior can have a big impact on the global ecosystem. This 
could lead to benefits for all of the participating agents on 
behalf of small companies.  
    It is not only a matter of service composition, but of price, 
reliability and quality. These particular negotiation 
environments are not yet focused on delivering industrial, 
holonic manufacturing systems [12] to adapt to changing 
demand, but are instead focused on helping to reduce the 
enormous effort that companies invest in getting profitable 
contracts. Thus, there is not yet a connection between contract 
negotiations and Industrial Manufacturing Systems. However, 
establishing this connection, though out of the scope of this 
paper, is considered to be the next major research issue 
concerning Holistic Industrial Ecosystems [13].  
   Negotiation can be defined as an interaction of influences. 
Examples of such interactions include the process of resolving 
disputes, agreeing upon courses of action, bargaining for 
individual or collective advantage, or crafting outcomes to 
satisfy various interests. Negotiation involves three basic 
elements: process, behavior, and substance. Process refers to 
how parties negotiate: the context of the negotiations, the 
parties to the negotiations, the tactics used by the parties, and 
the sequence and stages in which all of these play out. 
Behavior governs the relationships among these parties, the 
communication between them, and the styles they adopt. 
Substance refers to what the parties negotiate over: agenda, 
issues (positions and, more helpfully, interests), options, and 
the agreement(s) reached at the end. 
  An essential element of ecosystems is the negotiation of 
alliances, which enable companies to join competencies as 
well as services and products into a complex offering. Given 
this, Business Ecosystems should be empowered with a tool to 
support tactical negotiation and agreement processes among 
O
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participants. This environment should support the creation of 
Virtual Organizations [27] with a common business goal, and 
should facilitate the building, stabilization, and improvement 
of the ecosystem performance on a shorter time frame.  
  This aspect is also highlighted in [5], which states, “...The 
dynamic networking of the organizations … drives to the 
dynamic co-operation of the players,” and “This will 
dramatically affect the ways enterprises are constructed and 
business is conducted in the future, and the actual slowly 
changing organizations will be replaced by more, fluid, 
amorphous and, often, transitory structures based on alliances, 
partnerships and collaboration.” 
  However, in most commercial negotiation environments 
where some negotiation feature is implemented, the network 
of intermediaries/suppliers is static and centrally regulated. 
New entrants must strictly adhere to the centrally-defined 
business rules and data formats of the technological 
infrastructure. In fact, current solutions (like the 
“marketplace”) are proprietary, managed, and pushed by 
strong intermediaries or big suppliers, typically squeezing out 
small independent players. The small suppliers cannot enter 
the network as full members and are faced with a severe 
digital divide: they are basically left out of large markets.  
   It is very common that one big company copes with big 
contracts from governments and other big companies by 
offering services at a large scale. It is also common that this 
company then subcontracts the services to smaller companies, 
which provide parts of the services at a local level. The big 
company thus starts negotiations with hundreds, or possibly 
thousands, of smaller companies. This scenario results in a 
population of small companies gathered around one big 
company. The big companies have the money the little 
companies search for. There is fierce competition to take 
shares of that money. On the other hand, the little companies 
not only have the services the big company needs, but can also 
serve other companies that offer money for their services. In a 
certain way, main contractors also have to compete to hire the 
best providers. The global picture is a sort of ecosystem of 
companies offering money for services. The whole set of 
populations around big companies turns into an ecosystem 
that has a dynamic behavior with respect to the number of 
companies that compete for contracts from the big companies. 
Today, enormous competition can exist for earning the 
contracts of one big company, and tomorrow, perhaps there 
will be no competition. The oscillations of high-low 
competition change the negotiation power of small and big 
companies and affect the terms of contracts and the benefits to 
the participating companies. Though competition is good for 
the main companies, small companies have the right to look 
for other opportunities, and that is why any type of 
recommender system for the business ecosystem would be 
very welcome. Thus, big companies would also compete. 
Small companies love the predictability of markets, 
specifically knowable prices and predictable, stable 
competition. In this paper, we design recommenders to 
provide stability to business ecosystems.  In section VII, we 
will see a concrete case of the dynamics of one big Italian 
company, Coopservices, and a population of small companies 
that are negotiating with it, in a sort of negotiation of alliances, 
as well as the benefit of negotiation recommenders for them. 
  Predictability gives power to informed negotiators. A 
common negotiation adage is to be prepared to walk away; 
that is, be prepared to abort a negotiation or to have an exit 
strategy [10].  If one knows there is low competition, he can 
expect counteroffers with better terms. This paper will further 
develop this idea, and will formulate it in section III in terms 
of an agent that negotiates on behalf of small companies, 
choosing deadlines and exit conditions, and helping agents to 
decide whether to close a deal or make a counteroffer.  
  According to the literature [2][4], business negotiations can 
be classified into two types: auctions and negotiations (which 
can also be considered reverse auctions).  Auctions primarily 
focus on price negotiation and follow a clearly structured 
procedure. Compared to auctions, negotiations are not 
exclusively based on the competitive approach, but are based 
on a more unstructured dealing and bargaining negotiation 
process. Business negotiations are based on specific legal 
documents and follow a specific workflow, which can vary in 
the number of iterations or steps necessary to reach an 
agreement [4]. There are several types of negotiations; the 
most general is the multi-bilateral, multiparty negotiation.  A 
multi-bilateral negotiation consists of several negotiations, as 
shown in Fig. 1. The negotiations are complementary and 
have one or several common constraints regarding a certain 
issue. For example, a negotiation for a trip can consist of a 
negotiation for a flight and a negotiation for a hotel and a 
rental car. Potential issues that might be common constraints 
include the total price of travel and the starting and ending 
date. Dependency is related to the negotiation issues that are 
defined during the set-up phase of a negotiation. Each of the 
involved negotiations might be of a different type. For 
example, the negotiation of the flight might be an auction 
(price) and the negotiation of the hotel might be a negotiation 
for whether breakfast and wireless internet are included once 
the price is agreed upon. Since each negotiation can itself 
consist of another negotiation (Fig. 1), a participant in a 
negotiation on one level can be the owner of a different (and 
nested) negotiation on a lower level. Issues and timing from 
higher-level negotiations can be inherited by lower-level ones. 
The case study of section VII represents a nested negotiation 
over two levels. On the first level, there is a bilateral 
negotiation with a main contractor. On the second level, the 
main contractor uses a multi-party negotiation to negotiate the 
required service or products. This model can be applicable to 
any industrial-provider model. For example, any big project 
for a new factory requires the integration of architecture, 
mechanical engineering, automation, security, energy, 
materials supply, transportation, and cleaning. These services 
can be further decomposed and bundled, so that providers can 
deal with larger or smaller parts of the project. For example, 
the main contractor could tackle several of the industrial 
services, including security, transportation and cleaning, but 
may have no experience in industrial automation, nor would 
this contractor be able to subcontract it. Then, the main 
contractor would subcontract part of the security, 
transportation and cleaning services to other local providers. It 
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is a sort of negotiation of alliances where the owner of the 
negotiation is the one who creates the group of companies that 
are going to work together. There are many options, and 
companies should choose their own negotiation style to adapt 
in their particular negotiation environment. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Multi-bilateral multi-party negotiations. 
 
   There is no negotiation style recommender in either state-of-
the-art recommender systems [6] or in recommender agents on 
the internet [14]. Therefore, there is an opportunity to create a 
new category of services devoted to the recommendation of a 
negotiation style for agents that negotiate in an open 
negotiation environment (ONE). This new category of 
services would act in a similar fashion to those agents who 
deliver their opinion to other agents when they have to 
provide a recommendation to their users, as described 
previously [15]. 
  This study is interested in the dynamics of a ONE within a 
digital business ecosystem (DBE), studied within a cluster of 
digital business ecosystems, www.digital-ecosystems.org, as 
part of a project of the same name (http://one-project.eu). This 
paper is structured as follows. Section II further explains the 
concept of negotiation styles; section III presents a negotiation 
style model and its dynamics; section IV describes a 
negotiation style recommender based on a simple one-
dimension monitor; section V shows a bi-dimensional monitor; 
section VI contains the negotiation style recommender 
implemented with a simulated annealing algorithm; section 
VII is a real case study; and section VIII concludes with final 
remarks and future work. 
II. ABOUT NEGOTIATION STYLES 
A negotiation can start with a published tender (by a tenderee) 
that invites interested companies to provide offers (offerers).  
A rejected or missing answer ends the contract negotiation. 
Contract negotiation continues with a counter invitation or a 
counter-offer.  
  We will focus on the number of counter-offers in a 
negotiation. We will name them “steps” in a negotiation, and 
they can also be referred to as “interactions,” as shown in Fig 
2. We will decide the agents’ negotiation styles by means of 
the number of counter-offers.  
Blake and Mouton [3] explains four types of opposing 
styles: cooperative vs. competitive and passive vs. active. The 
existing literature does not classify the number of steps in 
negotiations using the aforementioned negotiation styles. This 
paper suggests a classification of panic vs. confidence, 
wherein a panicked negotiator settles immediately and a 
confident negotiator settles over the long run. By considering 
that the pace of negotiation differs from country to country, 
and that the pace of negotiations in the United States is faster 
than in most other cultures [10], we may infer that this 
behavior (being fast) must have an impact on the outcome of 
negotiations. Generally speaking, for successful negotiations, 
a shorter negotiation is worse for the offerer and better for the 
tenderee if the tenderee had the power of negotiation. Having 
very few negotiation steps spread out over very long time 
windows (the Chinese style) is much worse for the offerer and 
much better for the tenderee. Long negotiations, despite 
aiming for a better outcome, suffer from a greater risk of 
deadlocks that may break the negotiations, with the 
corresponding risk of no outcome. In the long term, if one 
never settles, then there is no benefit at all.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Interactions in a negotiation. A counter-offer can be repeated 
many times. These are the steps used to settle a deal. 
  It seems that the optimal outcome is in the middle, meaning 
not settling immediately but not waiting a very long time to 
reach an agreement. Although some studies [4][10] have 
suggested saying “no” a final time when the deal seems close, 
whenever two agents apply this “say ‘no’ one more time” 
algorithm, it becomes heuristically better if they have a 
different pattern of saying “no.” Thus, diversity in negotiation 
styles could have a positive impact on populations of 
negotiating agents.  
We will adopt the Negotiation Styles approach of Blake and 
Mouton [3] and Karrass [10] in a narrow sense: one can be 
cooperative or aggressive in one dimension, as well as 
aggressive or passive in another dimension. The combination 
of the two dimensions provides four separate negotiation 
styles: accommodating, avoiding, collaborative, and 
competitive.   
  Let us think the negotiation as taking pieces of a pie. In the 
first dimension, one is aggressive if one seeks to take as large 
a “piece of the pie” as one can in a win-lose manner, by 
keeping all of the pie for oneself and leaving nothing for the 
opponent. On the other hand, one is being cooperative when 
making “the pie bigger,” so that there is more room for 
negotiation. Even if one takes the larger piece of pie, the 
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remaining pie is still big enough for the “loser” in a win-win 
or both-win [10] manner. 
  In the second dimension, being active tends to refer to 
thinking of many options and being very careful, which tends 
to increase the number of offers and counter-offers, the 
number of steps, and the time to close a deal. This approach 
could include being more entrepreneurial and more flexible 
and imaginative in trying to satisfy the demands of the 
counterparty. On the other hand, being passive means being 
inflexible to demands or not caring about the particulars of the 
deal, and this tends to result in a fast closing with few steps. 
 
 
Fig. 3. A classification of Negotiation Styles. 
   
In the following section, we will take the 2nd dimension of the 
passive-active negotiation style, namely, the one that is most 
linked to the number of offers and counter-offers in the 
negotiation. 
III. A NEGOTIATION STYLES MODEL INSPIRED BY 
COMPUTATIONAL ECOLOGIES 
     First, we analyze general properties of computational 
ecologies to understand their potential link to negotiation 
styles.   Perceptions and expectations concerning the current 
and future behavior of (eco)systems in many economic and 
social systems play an important role in determining the 
actions of an individual agent. Kephart et al. [11] closely 
investigated the dynamics of a model that captures the 
essential features of computational ecosystems, and analyzed 
these systems with computer simulations to gain insight into 
the effects of time delays, cooperation, multiple resources, and 
heterogeneity. They showed that a system performance can be 
improved if agents correctly predict the current state of the 
system.  Furthermore, reference [7] considered a procedure for 
controlling chaotic behavior in systems composed of 
interacting agents making decisions based on imperfect and 
delayed information. Their procedure used a reward 
mechanism, whereby the relative number of agents following 
effective strategies is increased at the expense of others. This 
is known as the Hogg-Huberman model (or simply as the 
Hogg model). References [9] and [16] have investigated the 
dynamic properties of a discrete-time Hogg model.  
  Hogg [7] proposed a computational ecology model of the 
interaction of a large number of agents and their competition 
for resources. Agents in a computational environment appraise 
the computational power that they will receive when they 
choose one resource over another (it is the amount of CPU 
share).  Unfortunately, they do not have instant access to 
information about the available computational power at every 
source, and thus the real computational power differs from the 
expected power, and worse, tends to be lower because of 
resource competition. 
 We begin by proposing a one-dimensional model, the one of 
being passive (close deals quickly) or active (close deals 
slowly).  We propose a new model for negotiation styles, 
refining the Hogg Model. We refer to this model as the de la 
Rosa model of multiple agents’ negotiation styles dynamics. 
This model consists of the interaction between a large number 
of agents and their competition in negotiating and settling 
deals with tenderees. The negotiating agents (offerer agents, 
or simply offerers) appraise the wealth, benefit, profit, or 
income they could obtain after choosing one tenderee over 
others. Although they may have instant access to information 
about tenderees’ wealth and information about the benefits of 
previous negotiations with any of the negotiation agents, 
offerers do not know the real benefits (if any) available at the 
moment they will set a deal. This is because many factors 
affect the progress of any negotiation, and thus, the actual 
benefits will diverge from the expected benefits. The benefits 
also tend to be lower than expected due to the considerable 
competition for the healthiest tenderees. 
  Let us demonstrate the de la Rosa model in regard to the 
dynamic behavior of a community of offerers negotiating with 
two tenderees within a ONE instance. This gives us two 
sources of business opportunities (the resources in business 
ecosystems) with which offerers must negotiate. We define fr(t) 
as the fraction of the offerer agents negotiating with tenderee r 
at time t. An interaction can occur in a two-tenderee 
ecosystem, wherein offerer agents re-evaluate the tenderees’ 
wealth as they continue to negotiate with them, attempting to 
maximize the benefit of contracts with those tenderees. The 
offerer choice is modeled by the following equation: 
 
      
( )rrr fdt
df −= ρα                                       (1) 
 
  where α is the rate at which agents re-evaluate their tenderee 
choice (whether it is fruitful or not) and ρ is the probability 
that an agent will prefer Tenderee 1 over 2. f1 and f2 are the 
fractions of the offerer agents negotiating with tenderees 1 and 
2, respectively. 
  The number of agents using the same fruitful tenderee as a 
resource for business contracts increases until too many agents 
are negotiating with this tenderee, while the payback from the 
offerer diminishes because of the increasing competition, with 
the result that prices decrease and benefits drop. Thus, the 
uncertainty (σ) is modeled as a typical deviation on 
performance to decide when tenderee 1 clearly drove an 
offerer agent to a more profitable contract (higher payoff) than 
tenderee 2.   erf  is the Gaussian error function. 
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  When working with fast (no) negotiation, that is, closing the 
deal very quickly and receiving the profit of the contract as 
soon as possible, the offerer agents’ choice of tenderee 
stabilizes after a transient period, as shown in Fig. 4 (left), 
which shows the stabilized population of agents negotiating 
with tenderee 1. When the settlement is postponed (delayed), 
the offerer agents have access to the contract’s profit by k 
sample times ago, and the ecosystem shows a chaotic behavior, 
as shown with the same tenderee in Fig. 4 (middle). The 
introduction of heterogeneity of agents with several delays 
introduces stability to the system as shown in Fig. 4 (right). 
 
   
Fig. 4. (Left) Offerer agents with no negotiation, and instant access to profit;  
(middle) Offerer agents with delayed access to profit because of a long 
negotiation process;  (right) Stabilization of tenderee usage in a group of 
heterogeneous (diverse) offerers. 
 
The de la Rosa model is analogous to the Hogg model, as the 
following map in Table I shows: 
Table I. Mapping of Hogg computational ecology to de la Rosa 
negotiation style models. 
Hogg (1) de la Rosa (2) 
Computational capacity of a 
CPU 
A tenderee’s wealth or available 
money or room for tenders 
Agents’ appraisal of CPU Offerers’ appraisal of tenderee wealth 
Delayed CPU information Delayed settlement (of negotiations) 
Delay: a number of time steps Delay: a number of negotiation steps 
(indirect relation with time steps) 
Payoff   G ( t,  da(F(t-nT) )   Payoff  G ( t+nT,  da(F(t)) ) 
 
  The difference between the two models is that in the Hogg 
model, when an agent a makes a decision da by appraising at 
time t with n steps of delayed information F(t-nT), it 
immediately obtains the payoff G (t, da (F(t-nT))) in the form 
of the computational capacity of the selected resource, while 
in the de la Rosa model, the agent makes a decision by using 
current information to appraise the payoff it will obtain in the 
future (after n negotiation steps) from the wealth of the 
selected resource. 
   With   G ( t,  da(F(t-nT) )  as the payoff of the Hogg model 
and G ( t+nT,  da(F(t)) ) the payoff of the de la Rosa model for 
the passive-active dimension of negotiation style, they become 
equal at t’=t+nT , where the payoff of de la Rosa model 
becomes G(t’, da(F(t’-nT))). 
  Therefore, some of the results obtained by Hogg can be 
mapped to the de la Rosa negotiation style model.  In his 
paper [7], Hogg shows how 40 heterogeneous types of offerer 
agents stabilize an ecosystem (Fig. 4 – right). In our work, 
each individual agent has a different delay for settling and 
accessing the profit/benefit. The delay, therefore, defines the 
negotiation style.  This approach presents some interesting 
features: 
 
• The entire system benefits from heterogeneity, allowing 
the whole ecosystem to stabilize the tenderee preference 
for negotiation. That is, the size of the offerer agents’ 
community stabilizes around each tenderee. 
• The stability of a system is determined by the behavior of 
a perturbation around equilibrium. Since heterogeneous 
systems are more stable than homogeneous systems [11], 
the important issue is to calculate how much diversity 
(“the mix”) is needed to stabilize the ecosystem.  In our 
case, the diversity is represented by the set of different 
delays that offerer agents can use when performing their 
negotiations. 
• This approach represents an interesting and simple 
mechanism to deal with heterogeneity in multi-agent 
systems, by means of a reward mechanism that introduces 
competition among the offerer agents through the 
“negotiation style” recommender, which will be 
introduced after the one dimension monitor in the 
following section. 
 
IV. ONE DIMENSION MONITOR  
A monitor will measure the distribution of the offerer agents’ 
population in terms of negotiation styles. The monitor will try 
to measure the stability of the populations of offerer agents 
negotiating with the tenderees in the ecosystem. A 
recommender might use the information from the monitor to 
stabilize the population of the open negotiation environment 
by balancing the population of different types of offerer 
agents that negotiate with the tenderees. This will be achieved 
by recommending changes in the offerer agents’ negotiation 
style, affecting the number of steps to reach a settlement, or 
altering the fulfillment percentage on the object of the 
negotiation.  
  Now we present some examples of the stabilization effect of 
introducing a diversity of negotiation styles only in the 
aggressive-passive dimension.  
A. Example with Two Tenderees and Three Negotiation 
Styles  
The three negotiation styles are: s = 0 (always accept, or 
passive), s = 1 (accept after at least one counteroffer), s = 2 
(say “no” one more time, or aggressive). 
 A and B represent the two tenderees, and all three scenarios 
are run under the same conditions: 
• Contracts with tenderee A have doubled the benefit of 
those with tenderee B. 
• Initial conditions f A = f B, that is, the same number of 
offerers are negotiating with tenderee A and tenderee 
B.  fA denotes the total number of offerers of any type 
negotiating with A, that is, ݂஺ ൌ ଴݂஺ ൅ ଵ݂஺ ൅ ଶ݂஺ . 
Analogously, the total number of offerers of one type s 
is ௦݂ ൌ ௦݂஺ ൅ ௦݂஻. The total number of offerer agents is 
20. 
• α = 1, ρ = I, and no agents are allowed to type 
change/shift. 
0
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• A maximum of 1 agent from any population changes 
tenderee at each step. 
 
Scenario 1. There are 20 offerers of type 0, f0 = 20 (f1 = 0). 
This means that all agents immediately settle with a “no” 
counteroffer. The run proceeds along 14 steps as follows: 
Time t stamp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
f A 10 11 12 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13
f B 10 9 8 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7
Profit from A 1/5 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6
Profit from B 0 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7 1/6 1/7
More  Profi t from A A A A B A B A B A B A B A
 
One can see that there is a cycle every two time steps, that is, 
a frequency of 0.5. 
 
Scenario 2. There are 20 offerers of type 1, f0 = 0, f1 = 20. 
That is, all agents settle with delay 1, after 1 counteroffer. The 
run proceeds along 15 steps as follows: 
 
 
Time t stamp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
f A 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 14 13 12 13 14 15 14 13
f B 10 10 9 8 7 6 5 6 7 8 7 6 5 6 7
Profit from A 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/6
Profit from B 0 0 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/6 1/7
More  Profi t from A A A A A B B B A A A B B B A
 
One can see there a cycle at six time steps in length, that is, a 
frequency of 0.167.  Experimenting with populations with 
different delays shows that average(fA) ≈ 2·average( fB).   
  One can easily observe in the following runs that as delay 
increases (the type of agents), variability also increases 
(increasing σ2).  A higher variability made he decisions 
become more difficult, and the population went toward 
chaotic behavior, as predicted by the Hogg model. 
 
 
 
Scenario 3. This scenario introduces diversity (heterogeneity) 
into Scenario 2 by letting two agents be of type 0, while the 
remaining eighteen are of type 1 (f0 = 2, f1 = 18); t= 1, …, 10. 
This does not change the initial conditions of fA = f B= 10. 
 
Time t stamp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1 f0 f1
f A 1 9 2 9 2 10 2 11 2 12 1 13 0 12 1 11 2 12 1 13
f B 1 9 0 9 0 8 0 7 0 6 1 5 2 6 1 7 0 6 1 5
Profit from A 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Profit from B 0 0 1/9 1/9 1/8 1/8 1/7 1/7 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
More  Profi t from A A A A B B A A B B
 
 
  As it can be observed in the following plots (Fig. 5), the 
oscillation bands in Scenario 3 with the heterogeneous 
populations of two negotiation styles (0 and 1) is narrower 
than those of Scenario 2 (smaller typical deviation of 1.0 
compared to 1.1 from Scenario 2), and has lower frequency 
than Scenario 1 (frequency of 0.25, twice as small as the 0.5 
from Scenario 1). This was achieved simply by introducing 
two agents of type 0. 
 
Fig. 5.  Few agents of type 0 stabilize a mixed population of agents. 
Disturbances at time step 13 are rejected.  
  In summary, the three scenarios demonstrate how delayed 
settlements destabilize the negotiation ecosystem, and how 
stability can be reestablished by introducing diversity.  These 
observations suggest that a recommender will tell agents to 
shift their delays in settlement in order to gain global stability, 
and further predictability for business. 
V. THE BIDIMENSIONAL MONITOR 
We now introduce a second dimension to the monitor 
negotiation style: competition vs. collaboration. This 
negotiation style dimension is deducible by measuring the % 
fulfillment as the percentage of the negotiated object or 
negotiation target. We heuristically propose that less than 50% 
fulfillment means that the agent is being cooperative, while 
greater than 50% fulfillment means the agent is being 
aggressive. Let us use the common analogy of “pieces of pie” 
to talk about the object of negotiation.  If the “pie” grows, 
then the fulfillment tends to reach 50% in pieces. In contrast, 
when the pie remains the original size, fulfillment tends 
toward 0% or 100% of the pie. With this simple assumption, 
we can also create a linear classification of the agent’s ai 
negotiation style in this dimension by applying the measure:  
 
Di = || 0.5 – Ri || ∈ [0, 1],      
 
where Ri ∈ [0, 1] is the fulfillment of agent ai with respect to 
his earnings target. 
0
5
10
15
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
Type 0, no delay, freq=0.5, σ2 =0.8 
 
 
 
Type 1, 1 step, freq=0.17, σ2 =1.1 
 
 
 
 
Type 2, 2 steps, freq=0.13, σ2 =1.6 
 
 
 
 
Type 3, 3 steps, freq=0.07, σ2 =2.1 
 
 
 
 
Type 7, 7 steps, freq= ?, σ2 =2.7 
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  This dimension can be split into d divisions. Lower values of 
Di mean that the agent is being cooperative, and higher values 
mean that the agent is being competitive. Since this dimension 
is ordered by this measure, and it is countable by means of 
divisions d ∈ [1, 2, …, dmax], the de la Rosa model is also 
applicable to this negotiation style dimension in the following 
way. If an agent makes the decision to close a deal at a certain 
fulfillment, he will receive the benefit d divisions apart from 
the target, and da(F(t)) = F(t)*d/dmax.  Now, F(t) is more 
precise than its formulation in section II; it provides not only 
information about the potential wealth of the tenderee, but 
information or guesses about his object of negotiation, his 
margin, and his negotiating room. 
 
G ( t+nT,  F(t)*d/dmax)                    (3) 
 
Adding the second dimension is a refinement of da(F(t)). The 
properties of the de la Rosa model studied for the first 
dimension stand for both dimensions, although only when 
they are taken into account together. The Ecosystem Monitor 
is one of the pieces of the recommender that considers only 
the cooperative-competitive dimension unless it is reduced 
again. 
  Now, we are ready to define a bidimensional monitor M of 
negotiation styles in an open negotiation environment as: 
 
M (nmax , dmax), 
 
  where nmax is the maximum number of steps to close deals 
(the higher the steps, the more active), and dmax is the 
maximum number of divisions in closing deals (the higher the 
values, the more competitive).  
   M (n, d) counts the number of agents at every negotiation 
style located at (n, d), so that every agent ai is defined by the 
negotiation style si = (ni, di). M acts as a distribution of agents 
in the space of negotiation styles.  
  Once the agents are properly classified at every moment by 
the monitor, the negotiation style recommender can work with 
recommendations targeted to every negotiation style. 
VI. A NEGOTIATION STYLE RECOMMENDER 
  A recommender might use the information from the monitor 
to stabilize the ONE within a digital business ecosystem (DBE) 
by balancing the size of the population of different types of 
offerer agents that negotiate with the tenderees. This might be 
achieved by recommending changes in the offerer agents’ 
negotiation style, by affecting the number of steps to settle or 
the number of divisions for their negotiating room. The 
recommender suggests shifting by α steps the type s that 
defines the style of negotiation of an offerer agent towards 
another type, s+α, where α is a tuple of integers. 
  Therefore, the monitor will take care of balancing the 
population of agents, conveniently parameterized by s 
negotiation styles. The idea is as follows: 
• #s : = nmax · dmax  is the number of negotiation styles 
• T1 and T2 are two different time windows (T) 
• O is an instance of a ONE 
• fs , fr ⊆ O are subsets of negotiating offerer agents of 
types s and r  
• ε ,  θ ∈ ℜ 
• H (O, #s, T) measures the offerers’ population stability 
in O, with #s types of agents, in a time window T. The 
higher the stability, the better. Direct or indirect 
measures of stability include typical deviation, 
entropy, and the Shannon information measure [18]. 
  The recommender will balance the offerer agents’ 
population of every type s (negotiation style), and informs 
agents of in-use negotiation styles so that agents change 
from using a style with a relatively large population to 
using a style with a relatively small population. The actions 
are as follows: 
 
1. If H(fs,s,T) < H(fr,s,T), then recommend 
agents of type s to change/shift to type r. 
2. If H(O,s,T1) < ε (unstable), then #s := #s+1 
(the number of negotiation styles is increased). 
 
Any population of negotiation style s that stays small (fs < θ) 
during T2 will disappear by making #s := #s - 1 (the 
number of negotiation styles is decreased), and the 
recommender then tries to extinguish the population fs by 
distributing/recommending to agents of this population to join 
other populations with different negotiation styles.  
A. A Simplification of the Negotiation Style Recommender 
The former algorithm requires a measure of the stability of the 
business ecosystem, and it is a type of greedy algorithm.  By 
considering that the de la Rosa model guarantees, from the 
point of view of diversity, the stability of the ecosystem, it 
might be necessary to rethink the recommender task of simply 
redistributing agents across the space of negotiation styles.  
    To do so, we apply [17], a Simulated Annealing-inspired 
algorithm to obtain a distribution of agents as flat as possible. 
Simulated Annealing is a type of learning, adaptive and 
evolutionary algorithms [25], specially adapted for search. So 
far, there is no reported previous application to the field of 
recommender systems though it has had several industrial 
applications in forecast [26]. It may behave similarly to 
collaborative filtering [6]: classify the agents according to 
their behavior and then make them have uniform behavior. 
The heuristics is that the monitor represents a surface with 
mountains as piles of agents at a grid on a surface; one then 
begins shaking the surface, and some agents fall from their 
piles to lower piles. If the shaking is strong, the agents may 
abruptly jump from one style to another, but if the shaking is 
moderate, the agents will tend to form a flat surface. Flatness 
refers to uniformity, high heterogeneity, and high entropy. 
This can also be obtained by a series of greedy algorithms, 
sorting out the proper place for agents from many random 
starting points. 
  The following pseudo code implements the simulated 
annealing heuristic, starting from state s0 (style s0) and 
continuing to a maximum of kmax(s) steps (the maximal 
number of neighbors for s), or until a state with energy Mmax 
or less is found. The call neighbor(s) should generate a 
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randomly chosen neighbor of a given state s; the call 
random() should return a random value in the range [0,1). 
The annealing temperature TEMP should yield the temperature 
to use, in a range of temperatures (0, 1]. The state (s, s0) is a 
tuple indexing on M[n,d], which is the monitor of 
Negotiation Styles in a matrix of n steps (active-passive 
dimension) and d divisions (collaborative-aggressive 
dimension).  P(e,en,TEMP) should return a value in the 
range [0,1] and is implemented  as  (e+1)/(en+1)*TEMP, 
which follows the definition of P for simulated annealing. The 
recommendation Rec is another bidimensional matrix [n, d] of 
tuples (x, y) reflecting the recommended shift in both 
dimensions for every agent of style s0. 
 
for all s0 ∈ [n , d] 
  Rec (s0) = Simulated Annealing (s0, M) 
endfor 
 
Algorithm: Simulated Annealing (s0, E) 
  // SA with fixed temperature 
  s := s0; e := M(s) // Initial state, energy 
  k := 0             // Energy evaluation count 
  while k < kmax(s) and e > Mmax 
         // While time remains & err not good enough 
    sn := neighbor(s)//   Pick some neighbor 
    en := M(sn)      //   Compute its energy 
    if P(e, en, TEMP ) > random() 
       //Should we move to it if it is the next best? 
    then s := sn; e := en  // Yes, change state 
    k := k + 1       //   One more evaluation done 
  endwhile 
return s0-s       //The best movement direction 
 
The dynamic behavior of the whole population of offerer 
agents is a confluence of the results of their negotiations as 
well as the decisions they make while observing the 
recommendations. That is, an agent may try to follow the 
recommendations, but the negotiation output might be 
different than expected. For example, the recommendation 
could be to reduce the time to close a deal, but the agent, even 
if it tries, may not be able to; the time might even increase. 
The important fact is that in the mid and long term, the 
recommendation effect might prevail, and its beneficial effects 
will be seen at a global level. Sometimes, the recommendation 
can lead agents into trouble and cause them to lose money, but 
the global impact will be good. 
  The algorithm works with TEMP as a parameter that has to 
be set heuristically at a moderate level. In contrast to the 
original simulated annealing, our implementation needs to 
keep the temperature constant, continually shaking the surface 
of agents’ negotiation styles. 
 Finally, if TEMP = 0, then the method works as a greedy 
algorithm. 
VII. CASE STUDY: A MONITORING AND NEGOTIATION 
STYLE RECOMMENDER EXEMPLIFIED WITH 4 POPULATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, an essential element of digital business 
ecosystems is the negotiation of alliances, which enable 
companies to join competencies as well as services and 
products into a complex offering. James Moore’s2 vision of 
Business Ecosystems [28] has been partially supported by 
Web 2.0, and more recently by the achievements in B2B 
networking systems that have enabled enterprises to 
efficiently cooperate [20].  Given this fact, the case study is of 
a Business Ecosystem that is empowered by a tool supporting 
tactical negotiation and agreement processes among 
participants, especially small companies. This environment 
supports the creation of Virtual Organizations with a common 
business goal, and facilitates the building, stabilization, and 
improvement of the ecosystem performance on a shorter time 
frame.  
     A first and prime implementation is the Digital Business 
Ecosystem Project (DBE), which has been defined by the 
project team [5] as “...an open-source distributed environment 
that can support the spontaneous evolution and composition of 
software services...” [20]. The ONE project3 aims to provide 
organizations (especially small and medium enterprises - 
SMEs) with a sophisticated negotiation mechanism that will 
help SMEs to extend their portfolio of services, thus 
increasing their ability to fulfill more complex customer 
demands at a faster pace.  
  For our experiments, we use a negotiation environment that 
has no central governance cockpit or console with which to 
administer negotiation models and ongoing processes. The 
execution of the negotiation process will be hosted on each 
participant’s hardware, not in a central node, thus reducing 
concerns about privacy.  This also avoids susceptibility to a 
single point of failure. 
  The ONE platform [20] offers many information services for 
Open Negotiation Environments, one of which is the 
recommender for SMEs.  Here, we consider the case of one of 
the users of the ONE platform, Coopservices (CS), an Italian 
company that provides a large number of services, from 
cleaning, security, porterage, reception and catering, to 
logistics, transportation and public lighting management. Its 
principal value is that it can compose any subset of its services 
in a package with a bid. Normally, CS subcontracts local 
Italian providers to complete its package and bids. In this 
paper we focus on cleaning and security bundles. 
  The CS national service referent and the local suppliers can 
be considered as an informal ecosystem as defined by Moore 
[19] [28]. The companies cooperating together with CS in 
order to provide complete cleaning and maintenance services 
can be competitors or cooperators, as they provide 
complementary services. Furthermore, most of the companies 
involved in cooperation with CS are known to each other and 
have experience in cooperating with each other. During the 
cooperation, a common language is developed in areas 
relating to product and service description, so that 
communication becomes easier. In all, CS counts an average 
of one thousand negotiations per year. Every negotiation 
has an average of three companies participating, with a 
minimum of one and a maximum of ten. The negotiation 
process can last from one month to one year, taking, on 
                                                 
2 Dr. James F. Moore is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Law School's Berkman 
Center for the Internet and Society. 
3 34744 ONE: Open Negotiation Environment, FP6-2005-IST-5. 
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average, six months for public contractors and one month for 
private ones. Referring to the negotiated volume per year, CS 
manages from 1 to 20 M€, with an average of 7 M€. 
  Considering the many possible negotiation approaches, CS 
uses both on-line and secret auctions, and open and on-
invitation tenders. Auctions involve a public or highly 
structured contractor like a multinational company, and are 
adopted in 60% of cases. Tender is adopted in 40% of cases, 
usually involving less-structured contractors. During 2006, 20% 
of the negotiations (200 out of 1,000) were successful. The 
main reasons for negotiation failures were related to pricing or 
technical inadequacies. The national negotiation process uses 
many technologies: telephone calls, fax, and standard and 
certified emails. Today, they use the ONE platform on the 
internet. Internally, CS manages the negotiation through an 
information system with entries on the commercial and 
technical-planning sides. Internally and externally, the service 
proposal is constructed by circulating a standard model 
(Italian, Attività di Progettazione) that evolves during the 
process. The IT equipment of negotiation partners varies, but 
CS generally requires a standard profile composed of 
telephones, computers, the internet, and Microsoft Office.  
    Fig. 6 depicts the current negotiation situation at CS. The 
process is accomplished by filling a standard model, internally 
with a dedicated section of the commercial IT system, and 
externally via emails.  
 
Fig. 6.  The Negotiation Flow Driven by CoopService (CS). 
 
 
 
A. Selection of the Negotiation Approach 
  By the term negotiation, CS means the circular and 
incremental verification of requests, involving both technical 
and economic constraints. CS also understands the auction 
negotiation process where the answer is provided in a more 
direct way. Usually, CS decides to use auction or tender types 
of negotiation upon the request of the manager, and mostly 
depending on the outside requirements, but never under a 
company policy. 
  There are some criteria inside CS that drive the choice of a 
potential business partner: 
1. The partner is already under contract with CS (this is 
considered to imply the next two points) 
2. Technical capacities 
3. Economic convenience 
4. Normative constraints: on the sub-contracts in the 
public sector (Italian Legge Merloni), on the 
administrative transparency and responsibility 
(Italian Legge 231), and on the liberalization of 
services (Italian, Legge Bersani). 
  External partners are listed and evaluated in an internal 
database. There is also a blacklist of companies that are not 
considered suitable for collaboration. Partners could be totally 
or partially owned companies, or external companies with 
whom CS has a trusted relationship. Partnership with 
companies that are territorially closed to contractor sites and 
are certified by CS is considered more suitable. Negotiations 
could be open and public or restricted and private, and 
sometimes partners also provide a public contest on their own. 
The IT infrastructure and knowledge are, in any case, not 
relevant for the selection and involvement of partners. 
  CS does not allow potential partners to subcontract with 
other suppliers. This means that the negotiations usually 
consider only the first level of suppliers. 
  CS works as a tenderee in the open negotiation environment, 
and it is one of the many tenderees that work at this main level 
of contracting in Italy. CS has to achieve good terms in their 
contracts in order to do competitive and sustainable business, 
but it also has to look after its local suppliers, the tenderees, 
which need an adequate profit margin to stay in business.   
 
B.   The Monitor and Open Loop Recommendation 
CS and other tenderees already have sufficient information 
about the types of providers, and intuitively this promotes 
competition within all categories of local suppliers. The new 
monitor of this paper is devoted to offerers, the small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) who work hard to win contracts, 
and a recommender system that supplies benefits for the 
whole ecosystem of offerers and tenderees.  The monitor takes 
the negotiation logs from CS and other main contractors, and 
for every deal (contract), records the number of steps the deal 
takes to settle (sometimes it may take one year to settle) and 
the % fulfillment. 
  The ONE platform has a Centralized Log Management. This 
stores log data in a central repository though a Distributed 
Knowledge Base (DKB), which is a good solution for a log 
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repository in both centralized and distributed (P2P) platforms.  
In this study, we focus on those negotiations related to the 
bundling of cleaning, security, porterage, and reception, where 
CS subcontracts at the local level.  Some companies offer only 
cleaning, but others offer interesting bundles of porterage, 
reception and cleaning. The variety of bundles is surprisingly 
wide, as are the price and quality of the offerers. 
  Recall that the goal of the recommendation strategy is to 
achieve a balance between negotiation style populations. For 
the sake of simplicity, let us keep the one-dimensional 
monitor (the passive-active dimension) and four negotiation 
styles that range from a few weeks up to one year. 
  Primarily, the monitor will segment the s negotiation styles 
into N categories ௜݂′;  ݅ ൌ 1. . ܰ, such that several populations 
will fit in a category; that is, the category will contain several 
negotiation styles, and therefore ௜݂′ ൌ ௦݂భ ൅ ڮ൅ ௦݂ಾ೔ .  The 
number of categories depends on the granularity we use for 
the negotiation styles, with the limits N ≤ #s, and the 
complexity we can reach with the recommendation strategy.    
  The goal is to obtain a uniform distribution of negotiation 
style types, that is ׊݅,ܯ௜ ൌ
#௦
ே
 . Let us take N = 2, ଵ݂′ ൌ ଴݂ ൅ ଵ݂ 
as the category with a low number of negotiation steps, and  
ଶ݂
′ ൌ ଶ݂ ൅ ଷ݂  as the one with a high number of negotiation 
steps. If we put the categories on a one-dimensional axis from 
a low to high number of steps, then the ଵ݂′ category will be on 
the left and the ଶ݂′ category will be on the right. Negotiations 
on the right can take up to one year. Negotiations on the left 
can be as fast as a few weeks. 
  As previously described, the monitor will then continuously 
count the number of steps that agents effectively use in their 
negotiations in every ONE instance, and will represent them 
in tables like Table II. The monitor will also calculate stability 
measures, such as the entropy H represented in Table II, at 
every time step t. At each time step, the recommender will 
decide what category shifts must take place. In our example, 
this is very simple: the recommender suggests agents shift 
from left to right, or vice versa.  Since there are several 
categories, in the future, the recommendation should be much 
more sophisticated in terms of deciding how many 
populations to manage, how to classify agents into 
populations and what the temporal windows to back these 
decisions are.  
  Table II depicts an evolution of populations in our 
experiment with data obtained from CS, with a sample of ten 
companies selected from one thousand. At every time step of 
6 months, the shifts of SMEs (the agents) can be seen from 
one type of negotiation style to another after measurement of 
their deal settling time. The shifts are spontaneous because 
agents vary the number of steps to settle for various reasons, 
including the tenderee changing the conditions, difficulties in 
fulfilling the tenderee conditions, a change of skills of the 
offerers, and simply because of their own decisions as agents.  
This is what we term the natural evolution or natural run of 
the population, spread across the four types, and showing a 
certain preference to be passive at the lower zero and one 
types of negotiation style (there are 7.8 agents on average at 
those types compared to 2.2 agents on average at the higher 
types). This preference is possibly a result of these companies 
possessing very low negotiation power compared to CS due to 
their difference in size (they are SMEs) or their financial 
situation, which makes them desperate for the CS business. To 
ensure statistical stability, the results of each experiment were 
averaged over 100 test runs over the logs, and the mean results 
are reported. Where necessary, a Student’s t-test was used to 
confirm statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Table II. Original dynamics of the run of four populations of 
negotiation styles regarding tenderee CS and an open loop 
recommendation. 
t f 0 f 1 f 2 f 3 f' 1 f' 2 H
0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0,00
1 7 3 0 0 10 0 0,52
2 5 3 2 0 8 2 0,99
3 5 2 2 1 7 3 1,26
4 4 3 2 1 7 3 1,32
5 4 3 1 2 7 3 1,32
6 3 3 1 3 6 4 1,37
7 3 4 1 2 7 3 1,32
8 4 4 1 1 8 2 1,19
9 4 4 1 1 8 2 1,19
10 3 5 1 1 8 2 1,16
average 7,8 2,2 1,18
Open Loop Recommendation
L-->R
L-->R
L-->R
--
L-->R
--
L<--R
L-->R
L-->R
--
L-->R
 
 
C. Closing the Loop 
Table III depicts the recommendations at every time step 
given by the simulated annealing-inspired algorithm. “LÆR” 
indicates a recommendation that agents with lower (left) types 
are recommended to move to higher (right) types, and “LÅR” 
indicates the inverse, while “--" indicates that there is no 
recommendation.  
 
Table III. List of Recommendations in a closed loop – Greedy 
algorithm. 
t Recommendation f 0 f 1 f 2 f 3 f' 1 f' 2 H
0 L-->R 10 0 0 0 10 0 0,00
1 L-->R 4 3 3 0 7 3 1,04
2 -- 2 3 5 0 5 5 1,02
3 L<--R 2 2 5 1 4 6 1,30
4 L<--R 1 3 5 1 4 6 1,35
5 L<--R 1 3 4 2 4 6 1,51
6 L<--R 0 3 4 3 3 7 1,57
7 -- 1 4 4 1 5 5 1,39
8 -- 2 3 5 0 5 5 1,02
9 L<--R 2 2 6 0 4 6 0,91
10 L-->R 1 5 4 0 6 4 1,03
average 5,2 4,8 0,99  
 
The result after the recommendations is that some agents tried 
to modify their negotiation styles. Few succeeded because it is 
not straightforward to change, since the number of steps 
depends not only on the offerer agents, but also on the 
tenderees and competition.  Table IV shows the impact of 
recommendations on the natural run of the population at every 
time step in a situation where there is feedback following each 
time step (Temperature (TEMP) = 0.5 in Table IV; compared 
to TEMP = 0.0 for the greedy algorithm in Table III). 
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Table IV. Impact of recommendation on the populations by means 
of simulated annealing. 
t Recommendation f 0 f 1 f 2 f 3 f' 1 f' 2 H''
0 L-->R 10 0 0 0 10 0 0,00
1 L-->R 4 3 3 0 7 3 1,04
2 -- 2 3 5 0 5 5 1,02
3 L<--R 2 2 5 1 4 6 1,30
4 -- 1 4 4 1 5 5 1,39
5 -- 1 4 3 2 5 5 1,51
6 L<--R 0 4 3 3 4 6 1,57
7 L-->R 1 5 3 1 6 4 1,35
8 L-->R 2 3 3 2 5 5 1,51
9 L<--R 2 2 4 2 4 6 1,46
10 L<--R 2 3 3 2 5 5 1,51
average 5,5 4,5 1,49  
Entropy in Tables II, III and IV is represented as the H, H’ 
and H’’ columns at every time step t. We calculate the steady 
state entropy as an average of the last three steps of every run 
to make the comparisons. The recommendation of negotiation 
style shifts in the simulated annealing produced substantial 
increases in entropy, H’’ > H, which implies improved 
population balance and higher diversity: the populations are 
flat, more so than without any recommendation.  As shown in 
Table V, the simulated annealing algorithm obtained the 
highest steady state entropy through the greedy algorithm, and 
better balanced the left f1 and right f2 populations.  
  Since the important fact is having a higher entropy, the 
simulated annealing is our suggested algorithm for negotiation 
style recommenders.  
 
Table V. Comparison of the steady state entropies and balance of left 
and right populations.  
 
Analysis f' 1 f' 2 H
Original dynamics 7.8 ±0.17 2.2 ±0.17 1.18 ±0.05
Greedy 5.2 ±0.16 4.8 ±0.16 0.99 ±0.05
Simulated annealing 5.5 ±0.23 4.5 ±0.23 1.49 ±0.1   
 
According to the de la Rosa negotiation dynamics model, 
higher diversity stabilizes the ONE, which improves the 
predictability and business opportunities of the whole digital 
business ecosystem, as shown in the examples of section III. 
VIII. FINAL REMARKS 
This research proposes the negotiation style recommender as a 
new category of recommenders. Recommendations are 
executed by agents by increasing or decreasing the number of 
steps before settlement, and by increasing or decreasing their 
expected fulfillment.   
   The result is a recommender scheme that is conceptually 
simple yet powerful for large populations (thousands or 
millions of agents), and which operates with low 
computational complexity.  This simplicity comes from the 
dynamics of the de la Rosa negotiation style model, inspired 
by the Hogg model of computational ecologies. 
  The scenarios presented here show that a greater diversity of 
offerer agents helps to stabilize the ecosystem of negotiating 
agents. This diversity is good according to the de la Rosa 
model, because wealth goes to a wider number of offerer 
agents, who work on behalf of small and medium companies – 
SMEs. Our experiments demonstrated how the monitor tracks 
homogeneous populations of offerers (those with lower 
entropies) and lets the recommender introduce increasing 
diversity of negotiation styles, so that those populations will 
then have higher entropy. Future versions of the recommender 
will reward agents for their change in negotiation style, 
perhaps in the same way that governments use taxes to induce 
changes in economic behavior.  We suggest focusing on two 
axes, rewarding schemes and mining techniques, to back the 
classifications of agents into negotiation styles. If agents are 
not properly classified, the recommendation is simply 
impossible. It is therefore critical to solve this issue. 
  When having a powerful classification of agents into 
negotiation styles, a simple recommendation algorithm based 
on simulated annealing is proposed. It is not strictly necessary 
to measure the stability of a ONE Ecosystem, and the 
recommender merely needs to keep the population of agents 
as flat as possible in terms of their negotiation styles. The de 
la Rosa model forecasts the stability of the ecosystem, at least 
from this point of view. The results show that this approach is 
workable. 
 Concerning a wider picture of the future research on 
negotiation recommenders, let us have a look at Fig. 7. This is 
the architecture of a full recommender for a business 
ecosystem.  
 
Fig. 7.  The architecture of the full open negotiation environment 
recommender. 
 
 The Ecosystem Monitor is one of the pieces of the 
recommender. In the ONE platform, the ecosystem monitor 
keeps a log of the percentage (%) of expectation fulfillment 
and the number (#) of negotiation steps. This information is 
used to make recommendations on negotiation styles by the 
NSR (Negotiation Style Recommender). The 
recommendations are not sent directly to the agents, but 
instead pass through an Active Offer Shaping [23], which 
takes issues and ratings from the log and integrates the 
recommendations from a partner’s recommender module [22], 
and a negotiation dissolution recommender module [24], 
Recommender
Ecosystem Monitor
(measuring ecosystem properties by classification)
Manual user 
(siri Walter)
Negotiation…
Exe Environment
ONE Log System
(PIR) Partner Recommender
(NDR) Negotiation Dissolution Rec.
(NSR) Negotiation Style Recommender
Partners Negotiation Style
Trust
# neg. steps
Ratings
Issues/Attrib
% expectation fulfilment
Suitability
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which take information from the log such as trust and 
suitability. A user from the Tenderees’ side (Siri Walter is the 
user of the negotiation platform from CS in the ONE project) 
can use the information from the ecosystem monitor for other 
manual uses.  However, he has no access to the negotiation 
style recommender or other output of the recommender 
system, since it is only devoted to SME, the offerers.  The 
practical results of this work on the ONE project are restricted 
to a one-dimensional recommendation. Future work could 
focus on practical experiences with wider (multidimensional) 
negotiation style recommendations. Following are possible 
areas of further research, from highest to lowest importance. 
First, data-mining methods for estimating the granularity in 
the classification of agents regarding their negotiation style, as 
well as the measurements obtained using business ecosystem 
monitors, need to be further investigated. Second, standard 
techniques, like collaborative and content-based filtering [6] 
[14], may be applied to negotiation styles, as well as to trust 
approaches for recommendation [14], not only to shaping 
offers [23].  Third, extensive research on partner 
recommenders to create virtual organizations that bid for 
contracts is necessary, since many small companies do not 
have partners when going to the tenderers. Fourth, further 
algorithms are necessary to estimate the proper moment to cut 
a negotiation off and walk away, so that agents know when to 
stop investing efforts in negotiations with low expected 
benefit.  The main efforts should be put to have good data-
mining methods to classify agents because this simplifies 
enormously the recommender algorithms.  
  The originality of our approach is that we are looking for 
global behaviors that will increase opportunities at an 
individual level.  However, some recommendations may not 
be appropriate for an individual agent at certain moments or in 
certain situations. Since our system only provides 
recommendations, agents may decide to follow them or not, or 
they can ignore them in order to follow the behavior of the 
tenderee (many agents think that the customer, who pays, is 
the boss); thus, further research into designing the proper 
rewards for agents will be necessary. 
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